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Transitions: The State of the Automotive Industry—A summary 
by William A. Strauss, senior economist and economic advisor, and Emily A. Engel, associate economist
The United States automotive industry has been undergoing tremendous changes in 
recent years. Speakers at a recent Chicago Fed conference explored these changes 
and considered the road to the future for the auto industry.
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In order to better understand the 
changﾭes takingﾭ place in the production 
of automobiles and to gﾭain some insigﾭht 
into what the future holds for the in-
dustry in the U.S., the 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicagﾭo held a con-
ference on Monday, 
June 11, Transitions: 
The State of the Auto-
motive Industry.1 More 
than 100 economists 
and analysts from busi-
ness, academia, and 
gﾭovernment attended 
the conference and in-
dustry experts were in-
vited to share their 
perspectives on this 
topic.
The changing face  
of automotive 
production
The United States automotive industry 
has been undergﾭoingﾭ tremendous changﾭ-
es in recent years. Some of these changﾭes 
include sigﾭnificant reductions in employ-
ment, factory closingﾭs, bankruptcies 
amongﾭ the supplier base, downgﾭrades 
on corporate bond issuances, and con-
solidations. One needs to merely pick 
up any daily newspaper to also see the 
market share losses by the gﾭroup for-
merly known as the Bigﾭ Three (now 
more appropriately called the Detroit 
Three—Daimler Chrysler, Ford Motor 
Company, and General Motors). 
While the Detroit Three have been 
dealingﾭ with mostly bad news, foreigﾭn 
nameplate producers are enjoyingﾭ a 
very different environment. Rather 
than closingﾭ plants, there are several 
automotive production facilities beingﾭ 
planned by these “new domestics” over 
the comingﾭ years.
If we look back to 1980, when there was 
very little production by foreigﾭn name-
plate firms in the U.S., the Detroit Three 
made up nearly 73% of all the ligﾭht ve-
hicles sold, while foreigﾭn-nameplated 
production in the U.S. was less than 2%, 
and imports represented just over a quar-
ter of the market (see figﾭure 1). Begﾭin-
ningﾭ in the 1980s, an ever-increasingﾭ 
number of foreigﾭn-nameplated vehicles 
begﾭan to be produced in the U.S. at 
factories that were referred to as trans-
plants. Througﾭh the early to mid-1990s, 
the popularity of the sport utility vehicle 
(SUV) supported the Detroit Three’s 
market share. In 1996, the Detroit 
Three’s market share stood at 72.5%, 
virtually the same as 16 years earlier. 
However, imports’ share had declined 
by 14 percentagﾭe points to just over 
11%, and new domestics market share 
had risen to more than 16% of the mar-
ket. The gﾭains of the new domestics 
came at the expense of imports.
Over the next ten years, however, the 
Detroit Three would not be as fortunate. 
Challengﾭed by the gﾭrowingﾭ number of 
foreigﾭn SUVs, risingﾭ energﾭy prices, and a flat overall sales market, the Detroit 
Three’s market share begﾭan to suffer. 
By 2006, their market share plungﾭed 
nearly twenty percentagﾭe points to 53%. 
New domestics sales had risen to near-
ly a quarter of the market, and imports 
sales rose to over 22%. So unlike the 
previous 16-year period, the loss over 
the past ten years of 20 percentagﾭe 
points of market share by the Detroit 
Three is the direct result of gﾭains by 
both new domestics and imports.
However, the market share of vehicles 
beingﾭ produced in the U.S. in 2006 was 
still over 77%, several percentagﾭe points 
higﾭher than in 1980, but by a gﾭreater 
number of firms than in the past. So, 
what has happened over the past ten 
years is less a concern about the loss of 
vehicle production in the United States, 
but more about the transition from the 
domestic industry beingﾭ comprised of 
the Detroit Three to an industry that 
has more producers. Consequently, 
the Detroit Three are playingﾭ a less 
dominant role in the industry.
While it is true that the new domestics 
vehicles had been made with less domes-
tic content than Detroit Three vehicles, 
this pattern has been changﾭingﾭ. Over 
the last ten years, new domestics have 
been increasingﾭ the amount of domestic 
content, while the Detroit Three have 
been loweringﾭ their domestic content, 
as they outsource more components. 
For example, 70% of the 2007 Ford 
Mustangﾭ’s parts were made in the United 
States and Canada, while over 85% of 
the 2007 Toyota Sienna’s parts were 
sourced in the United States and Canada.
Expandingﾭ on the role of foreigﾭn man-
ufacturers and markets in the auto indus-
try, Loren Brandt, professor, University 
of Toronto, presented his findingﾭs on 
China’s auto production. Brandt em-
phasized the importance of the Chinese 
market because of its recent economic 
gﾭrowth. For all the countries producingﾭ 
more than a million vehicles per year, 
China’s production gﾭrowth outstripped 
all the others in the market: from 2000 
to 2005, comingﾭ in at 181.3%. Duringﾭ 
the same time period, the results for 
other countries in that gﾭroup were 
quite mixed: U.S., –5.9%; Germany, 
4.2%; France, 5.8%; Spain, –9.2%; South 
Korea, 29.4%; Italy, –40.3%; and the UK, 
–0.4%. The gﾭrowth in the automotive 
industry, in fact, has been so largﾭe in 
China that it has begﾭun to cut back on 
its production of trucks, which are used 
for business, and to focus more on pas-
sengﾭer vehicles for its consumer market. 
The four main factors that Brandt be-
lieves are fuelingﾭ China’s auto sector 
are: 1) gﾭreater competition, which is in 
part due to tax cuts and China’s econom-
ic expansion; 2) a decrease in car pric-
es due to an increase in efficiency, which 
contributed to loweringﾭ of costs; 3) the 
improvingﾭ quality of Chinese producers 
compared to the Western producers, 
which is causingﾭ a quality convergﾭence 
amongﾭ top tier suppliers; and 4) a sub-
stantial increase in the export of parts 
and components, especially for the au-
tomotive aftermarket industry. These 
factors leave North American suppliers 
with the thougﾭht that Chinese firms 
should be viewed as a serious competi-
tor, as origﾭinal equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) in North America continue to 
increase their gﾭlobal supply base.
Finding the best production methods
Frits Pil, associate professor, University 
of Pittsburgﾭh, discussed value and prof-
itability in the auto sector. His presen-
tation higﾭhligﾭhted how manufacturers 
are buildingﾭ vehicles to optimize pro-
duction at factories rather than to match 
consumer desires. He started his pre-
sentation by notingﾭ that inventory needs 
to be viewed at three stagﾭes of the mar-
ket—parts suppliers, assembly plants, 
and the distribution channels (e.gﾭ., 
dealerships). He higﾭhligﾭhted that OEMs 
have a strongﾭ financial motive to ship 
vehicles from factories, since they book 
the sale at that point, even if doingﾭ so 
builds inventories at dealers’ lots. With 
higﾭher inventories than desired, the 
industry is then forced to offer largﾭe 
sales incentives (e.gﾭ., money back, or 
special finance and lease rates) in or-
der to sell this excess inventory. With-
out these sales incentives, dealers would 
find it difficult to sell the inventories 
on their lot, particularly those with less 
desirable colors or amenities. 
Pil pointed out that there are two basic 
options available for automobile com-
panies to produce vehicles: 1) build-to-
forecast, or 2) build-to-order. These two 
philosophies differ in aim, key measure-
ments, and risk. Build-to-forecast tries 
to predict demand and consequently 
minimize unit costs. It is based mostly 
on market share, labor productivity, and 
capacity utilization (how much of a fac-
tory’s total output potential is beingﾭ used). 
However, this approach often leads to 
both overproduction and a slow rate of 
feedback from consumers. Pil said that 
when people buy vehicles because of 
the largﾭe financial incentives beingﾭ of-
fered, the OEM regﾭards this as a success-
ful transaction and therefore believes 
that the color and amenity combination 
must have been a gﾭood fit. The OEM does 
not gﾭet feedback that the consumer 
would have preferred a differently con-
figﾭured vehicle. Additionally, the OEM 
does not know that the consumer would 
not have accepted the vehicle on the 
lot had it not been for the incentives. 
Build-to-order tries to maximize profit 
by matchingﾭ demand. In order to suc-
cessfully implement build-to-order, the 
OEM needs to receive actual customer 
information. There are fundamentally 
different ways of thinkingﾭ about cus-
tomers’ needs. Pil gﾭave an analogﾭy 
from the athletic shoe industry—
NIKEiD shoes versus mi adidas. With 
the NIKEiD shoes, the customer can 
choose their color combination, shoe 
model, and have a word printed on the 
shoe. However, the mi adidas shoe is 
actually created from the gﾭround up 
for your feet, with your personal mea-
surements. In other words, your shoe is 
built exclusively for you. Similarly, the 
automotive OEM needs to receive actu-
al information from dealerships to cre-
ate an automobile that a customer 
would actually want regﾭardless of incen-
tives. One possibility is to allow custom-
ers to customize their cars online. As 
Pil observed, “The auto sector is just 
startingﾭ on the path toward customer 
responsiveness.” The build-to-order ap-
proach could also increase the profit 
margﾭin per unit, because there would 
be fewer discounts, and the supply 
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efficient, because of the leaner stocks. 
There is a largﾭer cost for providingﾭ this 
flexibility, and the main risk is demand 
variability. On the other hand, Pil be-
lieves that build-to-order would be the 
superior approach for the market be-
cause the companies would be focus-
ingﾭ both on unit profitability and on 
customers’ needs.
Susan Helper, professor, Case Western 
Reserve University, observed that “United 
States automotive manufacturingﾭ is not 
dead yet,” but that there are challengﾭ-
es that the auto industry is facingﾭ. Cur-
rently, there are nearly 900,000 jobs that 
are directly related to automotive man-
ufacturingﾭ plants located in the U.S. 
Additionally, there are approximately 
4.5 million indirect jobs that are linked 
to the automotive industry. Recently, 
there has been more offshoringﾭ to low-
er-wagﾭe countries, but this had a wide 
rangﾭe of results, both beneficial and 
not so beneficial. Accordingﾭ to a Center 
for Automotive Research (CAR) report, 
largﾭe suppliers gﾭained most from the 
offshoringﾭ of information technologﾭy, 
and engﾭineeringﾭ was reported to have 
the next higﾭhest benefit. On the other 
hand, offshoringﾭ of human resources 
and sales positions was considered not 
to be advantagﾭeous to the company.
With so many U.S. jobs invested in the 
automotive industry, it becomes impor-
tant to consider the best ways to utilize 
those workers. Helper tackled this topic 
with her discussion of lean performance 
(achievingﾭ lower waste standards in fac-
tories). There are two types of lean 
models—learningﾭ lean and lean stan-
dardization. The first model focuses 
on orgﾭanizational flexibility and quality 
while also combiningﾭ lower waste prac-
tices within manufacturingﾭ. It promotes 
changﾭes in trainingﾭ practices, which re-
sults in a work force with higﾭher skills. 
The latter model, lean standardization, 
focuses on the technical aspects of re-
ducingﾭ waste while it provides perfor-
mance improvements; Helper believes 
it does not produce better performance 
than the learningﾭ lean model.
In addition to promotingﾭ efficiency at 
plants, Helper also touched on fuel- 
efficiency in vehicles. Since 1985, there 
has been little progﾭress in the fuel econ-
omy of vehicles. There are innovations 
that are in development—the use of fuel 
cells or hydrogﾭen—but the capabilities 
to produce and/or develop these ad-
vances will require a largﾭe effort on the 
part of the automakers. Not only do 
improvements need to be made on the 
existingﾭ technologﾭy, but there is also  
a shortagﾭe of skilled workers to make 
these improvements. A National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers’ study found 
that 90% of manufacturers report a short-
agﾭe of skilled production help, and 
65% of manufacturers have a shortagﾭe 
of scientists and engﾭineers. Without 
the increase in technologﾭy and skilled 
workers, the needed improvements 
will continue to be slow movingﾭ.
Learning from the past and  
moving forward
Jerry York, CEO, Harwinton Capital, 
spoke on the automotive industry chal-
lengﾭes from the past, present, and the 
future. York identified these respective 
periods as three wars: 1) the rise of the 
Asians; 2) value and variety; and 3) the 
developingﾭ markets and gﾭreen technol-
ogﾭy. York believes yesterday’s war was 
manufacturingﾭ productivity (total hours 
per unit produced). The Detroit Three’s 
manufacturingﾭ productivity did not come 
close to the numbers of the Japanese 
Three (Toyota, Honda, and Nissan). In 
1988, the simple averagﾭe of the Detroit 
Three’s productivity was 44 (the total 
hours per unit produced); by 2005 it 
had dropped to 34. However, the sim-
ple averagﾭe of the Japanese Three in 
1998 was 31, already below the 2005 
simple averagﾭe of the Detroit Three. For 
the Japanese Three, the simple averagﾭe 
of their manufacturingﾭ productivity 
edgﾭed down to 30 in 2005. 
While the Detroit Three have come 
closer to the manufacturingﾭ productiv-
ity of the Japanese Three, there is still 
a largﾭe window for improvement. The 
Detroit Three’s fall migﾭht have happened 
ten years sooner, had it not been for the 
development of mini-vans, pick-ups, 
and SUVs. Despite the success of their 
ligﾭht vehicles, problems with the quali-
ty of Detroit Three vehicles became an 
even bigﾭgﾭer issue. A J. D. Power 2006 
initial quality study (identifyingﾭ problems 
from the owners’ perspective in the first 
90 days of purchase or lease2) showed 
that the Japanese Three have fewer prob-
lems per vehicle than the Detroit Three. 
Lastly, the “rise of the Asians” was the 
result of differences in the time to market 
from development to delivery of vehicles. 
The time to market for the Japanese auto-
mobiles was in the rangﾭe of three years, 
whereas the Detroit Three hovered 
around five years, which is a largﾭe ad-
vantagﾭe because the Japanese automak-
ers are closer in time to the marketplace 
when they create their automobiles. This 
has led the market to find Asian cars to 
be more stylish and have an increased 
number of technologﾭical gﾭadgﾭets.
In addition, because the new domes-
tics’ plants are more up to date, they 
have a higﾭher rangﾭe of variability in 
their manufacturingﾭ. For example, the 
new plants are producingﾭ more than 
one type of vehicle; therefore, these 
new plants can respond to changﾭes in 
market demands more quickly. The old-
er plants that are beingﾭ closed by the 
Detroit Three typically made only one 
type of vehicle. In addition, the Detroit 
Three produce a wide variety of cars 
with gﾭreatly divergﾭent profit margﾭins. 
The Japanese Three are producingﾭ a 
more limited number of vehicle types, Kristin Dziczek, senior project managﾭ-
er, Center for Automotive Research 
spoke about the importance of labor 
relations in the automotive sector. Cur-
rently, the unionization rate in the U.S. 
automotive industry is below 23%. Ad-
ditionally, the Detroit Three are losingﾭ 
market share to the foreigﾭn nameplate 
manufacturers whose workers are pri-
marily nonunion. Both the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) and the Detroit Three 
are workingﾭ toward an agﾭreement that 
will allow the companies to be more flexi-
ble in this very competitive environment. 
While the UAW understands that the 
Detroit Three are strugﾭgﾭlingﾭ, it also is 
still strivingﾭ to maintain its basic princi-
ples for its employees: a middle-class 
standard of livingﾭ, equal representation, 
the best health care for the workers and 
their families, and an accessible way for 
the workers to contribute to social progﾭ-
ress and justice. At this time, the union 
wants to “seek to raise the standard of 
livingﾭ for its members.” Meanwhile, the 
Detroit Three want to further cut health 
care costs, shut down plants that are not 
beingﾭ fully utilized, and restructure other 
plants in order to help them become 
profitable agﾭain.
Conclusion
The presenters at the conference helped 
explain why the U.S. automotive indus-
try has been undergﾭoingﾭ major transi-
tions over the past 25 years. The keyword 
that seems to address the difference be-
tween the companies gﾭainingﾭ share and 
those that are losingﾭ share is flexibility. 
Flexibility allows firms to build-to-order, 
satisfyingﾭ market demands more accu-
rately and to modify production lines 
quickly in order to respond to changﾭingﾭ 
preferences. Fuel-efficiency has played 
a more important role over the last sev-
eral years, and our presenters seemed to 
believe that it will continue to influence 
the industry in the future as technologﾭy 
allows vehicles to be powered in new ways. 
The Detroit Three are strivingﾭ hard to 
match the flexibility of the new domestics 
and, with agﾭreements from their unions, 
they hope to be a more competitive force 
gﾭoingﾭ forward in order to stem the loss 
of market share over the past ten years.
with fewer trucks and luxury cars, which 
helps keep their profit margﾭins and 
productivity more consistent.
York believes tomorrow’s war will focus 
on political factors, low-priced cars in 
the developingﾭ markets, and the gﾭreener 
technologﾭy that will be available. The 
political factors will include national 
policy, currency exchangﾭe rates, auto-
maker objectives, and local preferences. 
The low-priced car will be affected by 
deterioratingﾭ profit margﾭins (the deal-
ers need to take a percentagﾭe, as well 
as the outbound transportation costs, 
leavingﾭ the manufacturers with a small 
amount of money to build the automo-
bile). The gﾭreener technologﾭy that cur-
rently exists is both turbo-diesel engﾭines, 
which exists in Europe, and ethanol 
fueled (E85) vehicles, which is available 
in the U.S., but at few gﾭas stations. The 
automakers are well underway to cre-
atingﾭ gﾭas–electric hybrid powertrains. 
In the future, there may be an all-elec-
tric plugﾭ-in vehicle, which will require 
a better battery technologﾭy than cur-
rently exists, or there is a small possi-
bility for fuel-celled vehicles. 
1 For details on the conference, please 
visit the web site at www.chicagﾭofed.orgﾭ/
news_and_conferences/conferences_
and_events/2007_auto_transitions.cfm
2  See www.jdpower.com/corporate/news/ 
releases/pressrelease.aspx?ID=2006082.